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Response Essay
JONATHAN SWIFT'S
CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY
Truth or Fiction?
John J. Burke, Jr.

Editor's Note: 1650—1850 seeks to open new modes of critical
exchange and to preserve forgotten or neglected ones. In this
"response essay, "John Burke revives the tradition of the occa
sional research commentary, the extended study inspired hy or
responding to a popular hook or research program that also
contributes its own ori^nal insists to an ongoing debate. The
occasion of Professor Burke's response essay is Claude Eawson's
influentialGod, Gulliver, and Genocide (Oxford University
Press, 2001).
nee upon a time—a long, long time ago, it seems—Jonath
an Swift was revered as a saint or at least as a near saint by
virtually everybody who mattered. His essay "A Modest
Proposal" was required reading in just about every freshman course in
the country. It was thought to be the most successful example of
sustained and effective irony in the English language. It was a wake-up
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call to the cruelties and absurdities that surround us. It was satire at
work for a good cause. Literature could and did matter. Gulliver's
Travels, also by Swift, was widely read, too. It was, for instance, part of
the required sophomore curriculum when I was attending college in the
1960s. Gulliver's TravelsMf&s not only a highly entertaining expose of our
vices and follies, it was thought to be a necessary antidote for the
sentimental goo that is always threatening to suffocate mushy humanis
tic thinking. The young are idealistic and swaddled in goo, but reality
bites hard. Swift helped prepare us for the big bites to come.
Now, though, it is spring 2004, more than forty years later. Now
we find this same Jonathan Swift, once venerated as a near saint, now
vilified in the academy as a criminal. The evidence for this "new" view
of Swift can be most easily and conveniendy located in a book by
Claude Rawson, entided God, Gulliver, and Genocide, published first in
2001 by Oxford University Press, and now issued in paperback.
According to Rawson, not only does Swift encourage and perpetuate
the kind of racist stereotypes that end in preposterous notions of white
supremacy, he is also responsible for the notions that have given
license, if not authorization, to genocide, that worst of crimes against
our common humanity. Rawson even manages to insinuate, however
improbably, that Swift, an eighteenth-century writer, is somehow
responsible for that unspeakable twentieth-century Nazi crime of
genocide against theJews. What gives? Has the Academy entirely lost
its senses?
A closer look at Swift's place in the Western canon would reveal
that his place has always been an uneasy one, though war crimes were
not quite the issue. Swift's views on sex and especially his attitudes
toward women are unquestionably troublesome and have long been
fodder for controversy within the Academy. But his views on other
things that mattered were more typically considered to be at one with
the liberal left even though Swift was and is more accurately described
as belonging ideologically to the conservative right. Still, it was Swift,
who brought the mighty British empire to its knees with his "Modest
Proposal," or so it was thought. There is not much room for doubt,
though, that Swift mercilessly ridiculed imperialism and that he showed
time and again how unreasonable were the "reasonable" ways of the
political powers-that-be. It was Swift who unmasked the insanity of
gunpowder and war.
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Unfottunately, though. Swift's success with the literary set at the
time drew him into what we now call the Western canon. As a member
of that exclusive dub, and with the passage of time, he along with his
fellow dead white males has fallen under a mushroom doud of
suspidon. No longer just guilty of bdng a hopeless male chauvinist, or
patronized as suffering from serious sexual hangups, he is now guilty,
along with all the other dead white males, of imperialism and radsm of
the most reprehensible kind.
If you are wondering how anyone derived radsm,imperialism, and
genocide out of "A Modest Proposal" and Gulliver's Travels, I am here
to tell you how. It is, I regret, an object lesson in the absurdities that
are being perpetuated even now in the sacred world of print. The
evidence, at least according to Claude Rawson, is to be found in the
language used to describe the Irish in "A Modest Proposal" and the
Yahoos in Gulliver's Travels. They are described as having thick lips and
flat noses, the females as having hanging breasts, both males and
females are sexually promiscuous. This might seem like awfully thin
grud for hurling such monstrous charges, but Rawson is arguing from
a theory of language that leaves the hapless writer guilty until proven
innocent—in the unlikdy event that a verdict of innocence would ever
be reached. It may be more accurate to say, that, Rawson has designed
his entire argument as a Catch-22 because the possibility of innocence
presumes that there would be somebody so foolish as to risk his or her
reputation in the Academy by arguing such an oudandish proposition.
So even if the writer doesn't really "intend" for such vocabulary to
arouse contempt or disgust towards people of a different race and/or
skin color, he—^and make no mistake about it, it is always a he—the
author is guilty. He is guilty because the mere fact of using it makes
him complicit in the vocabulary whose purpose was to make us think
of people of different races and/or skin color as inferior.
Nevertheless, Rawson's evidence for this is far more limited than
he would like us to think. Even if what he has to say about noses, lips,
and breasts were sound enough, he has chosen ever so cagily not to
notice the question of hair. One of the most striking components, and
perhaps the most striking one, in Gulliver's (not Swift's) description of
the Yahoos is their hairiness:
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At last I beheld several animals in a Field, and one or
two of the same IGnd sitting in Trees. Their Shape was very
singular, and deformed, which a little decomposed me, so
that I lay down behind a Thicket to observe them better.
Some of them coming forward near the Place where I lay,
gave me an Opportunity of distinctly marking their Form.
Their Heads and Breasts were covered with a thick Hair,
some frizzled [formed in small, tight curls] and others lank
[i.e., long, straight, and limp]; they had beards like Goats, and
a long Ridge of Hair down their Backs, and the fore Parts of
their Legs and Feet; but the rest of their Bodies were bare, so
that I might see their Skins, which were of a brown Buff
Colour. They had no Tails, nor any Hair at all on their
Buttocks, except about the Anur, which, I presume Nature
had placed there to defend them as they sat on the Ground;
for this Posture they used, as well as lying down, and often
stood on their hind Feet. They climbed high Trees, as
nimbly as a Squirrel, for they had strong extended Claws
before and behind, terminating in sharp Points, and hooked.
They would often spring, and bound, and leap with prodi
gious Agility. The Females were not so large as the Males;
they had long lank Hair on their Heads, and only a Sort of
Down on the rest of their Bodies, except about llieA»us, and
Pudenda. Their Dugs hung between their fore Feet, and often
reached almost to the Ground as they walked. The Hair of
both Sexes was of several Colours, brown, red, black and
yellow." (TV, i)
One might first note that Gulliver's yahoos come in all colors.
Nevertheless, Rawson insists that their thick lips, flat noses, and
hanging breasts are part of (or complicit with) that ideological
discourse whose clear intent is to stigmatize the other, that is, the nonwhite. What then about the hairiness of the yahoos? Hairiness may
conjure up notions that would associate savages or primitives with apes
or monkeys, but it is fairly obvious to anyone with eyes to see that
native Americans and native Africans are considerably less hairy than
their European counterparts. If we foUow the logic of this passage
from Swift, it would be Europeans—not native Americans or

Swift's Crimes

209

Africans—who more closely resemble the apes and monkeys who are
our hairy kinsmen a step or two down the evolutionary ladder.
Rawson also has trouble with color. This is especially significant
because no feature is more firmly linked to racism than skin color.
There is a famous passage in Book IV where Gulliver describes the
social structure of Houyhnhnm society. What makes it so stable and
so dependable is that it is structured by that most terrible of modern
sins, hierarchy. Hierarchy, it turns out, is necessary for this alternative
society to work. However, it need not be the endless and silly
hierarchical gradations that were to he found in European societies of
the time. Here there must he a master race and a servant race, that is
all. This arrangement among the Houyhnhnms is determined by color,
something which presumes, however unrealistically, that the color of
something, be it a horse's hide or the skin of a human being, can never
be disputed.
pdy Houyhnhnm Master, a Dapple Grey] made me
observe, that among the Houyhnhnms, the White, the Sorre/,
and the Iron-ffy, were not so exacdy shaped as the
the
Dapple-gr^, and the Black, nor born with equal Talents of a
Mind or a Capacity to improve them; and therefore contin
ued always in the Condition of Servants, without ever
aspiring to match out of their own Race, which in that
Country would be reckoned as monstrous and unnatural."
(IV.vi)
It is either amusing or painful or perhaps some kind of combina
tion of both to watch Claude Rawson trying to dance his way around
this passage, hut it seems clear enough why he feels obliged to dance.
The passage divides Gidliver's ideal society into two classes, and the
boundary lines are determined by race. Race, in turn,is signified by the
color of their skin. This should feed right into the current game of
gotcha. The problem, though, is that the wrong color is on top. It
should be white ruling over black to show how incurably racist we have
always been, but in this occidental Utopia, for some perverse reason, it
is black ruling over white, and there goes Rawson's argument, blasted
into smithereens by irrefutable textual evidence. There is no effort,
conscious or unconscious, in Gulliver's Travels and/or "A Modest
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Proposal" to argue the superiority of white Europeans over the rest of
the world. In fact, it is rather the opposite. Their purpose is to show
that there is no logical basis for separating them from us, much less
elevating ourselves over them. Human and yahoo are one.
There is, to be sure, one passage that seems to suggest that
miscegenation should be discouraged. In chapter viii of Book IV, we
learn that in Houyhnhnm marriages "they are exactly careful to choose
such colors as will not make any disagreeable mixture in the breed." It
is possible to conceive of a mixture of colors in horse breeding that
might be disagreeable, but it is hard to see howit would be disagreeable
among human beings. Nevertheless, the passage with its fairly overt
disapproval of miscegenation stands. We are, however, allowed to
breathe a sign of relief. Despite the obvious temptation presented by
such a passage, Claude Rawson somehow refrains from blaming Swift
for the wickedness of the American South, its practice of racial
segregation and the Jim Crow laws that forbade interracial marriages.
If you were puzzled at how anyone, never mind a respectable and
respected scholar, could for a moment entertain the thought that Swift
was perpetuating a racist ideology, you will be absolutely baffled about
how he has become transformed into a genocidal monster. One of the
purported bases for this is the persona of the Projector in Swift's "A
Modest Proposal," the fictional mask behind which Swift the author
hides. In the essay the Projector recommends marketing Irish babies
as the best way of appeasing the cannibalistic appetites of their
oppressors. Since this is what he is proposing. Swift's Projector could
be seen as arguing for genocide. This is not true, though; or at least it
is not technically true. The modest proposal certainly endorses
cannibalism, albeit indirectly, but it does not recommend genocide.
The Projector's scheme, for somewhat obvious reasons, does not
envision wiping out the race of Irish poor. To the contrary, wiping out
the poor would wipe out the opportunity for profits. The poor must
be always with us if the Projector's scheme for marketing Irish babies
is to continue to be viable. If there are no more poor, there would be
no incentive for the Irish to sell their babies. The opportunity for
profits would dwindle and eventually wither and die.
The best evidence for genocide as a solution to social problems
comes instead from Book IV of Gulliver's Travels. We first learn about
this when G\alliver describes the practices by which the Houyhnhnms
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govern themselves. We learn that they meet every fourth year in a
Grand Assembly where they have debated the same question time and
again: "One of these grand assemblies was held in my time, about three
months before my departure....The question to be debated was
whether the Yahoos should be exterminated from the face of the
earth" (IV, ix). We learn that Gulliver's Master, the Dapple-Gray,
borrowing from what he has heard from Gulliver about the gelding of
horses in Europe, proposes a rational (and humane?) final solution to
the Yahoo problem; castration of aU the males. If, of course, they
should do this, they would immediately render all the younger males
"tractable and fitter for use"; it would also "in an age put an end to the
whole species without destroying life" (IV, ix); thus the Houyhnhnms
arrive at a seemingly rational and humane solution to a devilish ethical
and moral conundrum. We never do learn, though, what the Houyhn
hnms ultimately decide, and therefore there is no textual basis for
determining if Gulliver (just possibly) or Swift (unlikely) would have
approved of such a solution. The point, if anything, seems to be just
the opposite: to draw attention to the logical result of rationallyinduced misanthropy, a narrative moment when we can if we want
stare into the abyss, and presumably react with horror and revulsion.
If some of the neocoloniaHst readers are deaf to the humanist
undertones in Swift's satire, there is not much chance Claude Rawson
is. He knows that his interpretation of the textual facts can be, and
probably should be, contested. He knows that there is no way that
someone can legitimately and fairly argue that Swift is a repulsive racist
or a genocidal monster. He is as aware or more aware than almost
anybody else of the traditional and mainstream interpretations that
have established Swift as the critic and satirist of the very things that
Rawson is claiming he is propounding. The real novelty—or if you
would like the real perversity—of his argument lies somewhere else.
His argument is that it doesn't really matter what Swift was thinking,
either consciously or unconsciously, he is still guilty. But how can this
be? This involves another convenience in Rawson's argument, the
notion of collective guilt. What really is at issue is language itself, or
more accurately. Western discourse. Swift can be thought of as guilty,
no matter what his personal thoughts and ideas may have been, because
Rawson makes use of a narrow, and wrongheaded, interpretation of the
logic of Saussurean linguistics. Swift bears responsibility for the
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Holocaust, not because he was somehow a twentieth-century Na2i living in the eighteenth century Ireland, but because his words or
paroles created—or at a minimum contributed to—la langue or language
itself, and therefore to the rhetoric or verbal discourse in the West that
made the Final Solution first thinkable, then doable.
Swift is also guilty by another measure. For he has dared to
mention the unmentionable. In other words, even by raising the
possibility that we can look down upon another because of the physical
characteristics associated with modern racial discourse. Swift became
complicit with the very racism he appears to be rejecting. By showing
or dramatizing a situation where genocide becomes the logical solution,
he is in effect endorsing or legitimizing a velleity that might never have
been valorized if it had not been for him.
It is with the notion of velleity that the lunacy of Rawson's
argument reaches its greatest height (or if you will its greatest depth).
For not only have Swift's "A Modest Proposal" and Gulliver's Travels
proved to be the cultural tools that have authorized or legitimized
unspeakable crimes against humanity, so has the Bible. What seems
nearly unbelievable if the words were not right there on the page for all
to see is that Rawson blames, or appears to be blaming, the single
greatest nightmare of the twentieth cenmry, the Holocaust, the death
of six million Jews, on their own sacred book.
One may be tempted to conclude that lunacy no longer has any
boundaries in the modern Academy, and that may be so. But there is
an argument—to be sure, not always spelled out—underlying Rawson's
thesis, and it ought to be spelled out. Rawson is, of course, tapping
into a discomfort or unease or anxiety about the Bible in the hearts of
all believers. For what he is asserting is of course undeniable. The
Judeo-Christian God as he is represented in the Book of Genesis most
certainly does commit genocide, if that is the proper word. In his
disgust with the wickedness and hardheartedness of humankind, the
biblical God sends a Great Flood that destroys all life except that which
was preserved in Noah's ark. The usual way that kindhearted believers
deal with their revulsion at such an atrocious act of cruelty is to say that
the ways of God are not those of humankind. Since God or Yahweh
is clearly a superior or even a supreme being, he is clearly not bound by
the same rules that bind us. He does much the same thing when he
destroys Sodom and Gomorrah for their wicked ways, in this last case
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preserving only Lot. According to Rawson, these biblical stories
provide both the inspiration and theautbori2ation for genocidal actions
that follow from whatever wishes we may have for vengeance of any
kind, more specifically to punish those who will not conform to our
standards of behavior. It follows, then, that the Nazis were merely
acting according to biblical teaching. The most obvious reply to such
preposterous logic is, of course, that the Bible is describing how God
has acted, not how human beings may or should act. When someone
such as Cain takes a human life, he is punished. Murder will later be
specifically prohibited by one of the ten commandments that will be
handed down to Moses. The Nazis could not possibly have been
acting in accord with the Bible unless they were reading it narrowly, and
selectively, thereby twisting and distorting it out of all recognizable
shape.
Swift's part in this comes as an endorser. He appears to be
endorsing such extreme and drastic solutions in both "A Modest
Proposal" and in Gulliver's Travels. In "A Modest Proposal," his
Projector recommends cannibalism as a solution to the problem of
poverty in Ireland, stopping short of genocide in the name of the profit
motive. In Book IV of Gulliver's Travels the General Assembly debates
a final solution to their problems with the Yahoos with a new twist.
The practices of the past would necessarily lead to mass slaughter.
Now, however, they have to consider if the same end could not be
achieved by castrating all the males.
The traditional interpretation of this has always been that this is all
satire. Swift is here making us face our darkest nightmares, but only to
make sure that our darkest nightmares never come true. Rawson will
have none of that, or at least not all of it. He acknowledges the moral
component of literary satire, and he insists he does not really believe
that Swift was a genocidal monster. There is, however, always a but,
and Rawson's but is a very big but, and one that seems to guide the
subtext of his entire tome. Swift is guilty of giving vivid expression to
our velleities, and thereby both pandering to them and legitimizing
them if not actually endorsing them.
What, may we ask, are these velleities of which Claude Rawson is
making so much? Well, Claude Rawson did not of course discover or
invent velleities. The concept of velleities has been around for a very
long time, though it may have never before been put to a use like this.
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Just about any standard contemporary dictionary will tell you that the
word is formed off the second principal part of a Latin verb meaning
to wish or to be willing, wlo, velk, volur, volition, volunteer, and
voluntary being other familiar English words formed from this verb.
A velleity is typically defined as either (1) volition at its lowest level [or
in its weakest form], or (2) a mere wish [or inclination] [unaccompanied
by an effort to obtain it].
For help with its use in the eighteenth century, we could turn to
Samuel Johnson's Dictionary (1755). But in this case Johnson did not
offer his own definition of this word, but he does offer us helpful
guidance. He relied, as he often did, upon two illustrative quotations
to make clear how the word was understood in the eighteenth century,
both of which are clearly consistent with modern definitions: The first
is fromJohn Locke (1632—1704) in a sentence that in fact comes from
Locke's
Concerning Human Understanding (1690): "Velleity is the
school-term used to signify the lowest degree of desire." The second
comes from the Anglican preacher [Robert] South (1634—1716): "The
wishing of a thing is not properly the willing of it; but it is that which
is called by the schools an imperfect velleity, and imports no more than
an idle, un-operative complacency in, and desire of the end, without
any consideration of the means."
It seems undeniable from such definitions that we are all huge
bundles of velleities, of all kinds. When I start out on a trip from
Tuscaloosa, Alabama, to some other destination, say. Providence,
Rhode Island; I can promise you I will wish that I would not have to
go through all the hassles that will be involved in traveling a thousand
miles even in our modern era. I am going to wish I could get to
Providence in an instant, merely by willing it. That, I can assure you,
does not happen, nor have I ever had any serious illusion that it would.
That, however, doesn't stop me from wishing it were so. What then
can we say about such velleities and how they impact on human life?
Not much, I would assume.
But, someone might say, imaginative literature belongs to the
realm of wishes and wish-fulfillment, not reahty. Claude Rawson, for
instance, is arguing that Swift has a discomforting kinship with Nazi
ideology. He seems to be bringing up such topics as cannibalism and
genocide because they represent his guilty but secret wishes. Sure, he
repudiates them, but only on the surface. He brings them up, and
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brings them up in such a vivid fashion only because he finds them
irresistibly alluring. This, according to Rawson, belongs to Swift's
psychobiography—something he claims not to be doing in what after
all is only a modest study of God, Gulliver, and genocide. The
unstated implication or corollary is that any of us who read Swift with
pleasure and (worse) -with approval are in effect participating in his
crimes; crimes of the heart, to be sure, but still crimes.
The end result of Rawsoris logic, though, would bring the
enjoyment of art especially the reading of literature pretty much to a
screeching halt. For instance, if I should read Ibsen's Hedda Gahler with
pleasure and/or approval, then I am most likely a misogynist. We may
have been so dense as to think that Ibsen in this play was exposing the
pathologies of bourgeois society, but in killing off Hedda and her
unborn baby at the end, Ibsen is really giving expression to a velleity
that wants to rid the world of uppity women, not to mention bother
some unwanted children. If I like so many millions of others should
applaud the movie Chicago, it must be because I approve of or even
want American women to kill their cheating husbands. Does anybody
really believe this is what is going on when we read Swift or Ibsen or
when we go to see a movie such as Chicago?
What may be most revealing in Rawsoris theory of veUeities, and
the place that they take in our reading of literature, is his emphasis on
the negative. According to Rawson, Swift flirts with cannibalism and
with genocide because they represent what he would really like to do.
When in conversation we teU someone to drop dead, or I'll killjou, the
literal meaning of those phrases may not be literal but they are still
revelations of the murderous imprises that dwell in the heart of
darkness within.
But why is it not possible to turn this whole thing around? Let's
say that the deepest wish in my heart is that aU the world can and
should live in peace and harmony, and even have prosperity. Can it not
be that when I am reading of cannibalism and genocide in Swift, I am
horrified and wish that these things just were not so? Couldn't these
be my veUeities? They could, couldn't they? But Rawson does not
want to take those kinds of veUeities seriously because they are so
sugary. He prefers the bitter, the dark, and the sour. Isn't there more
than just of whiff of misanthropy in this? Swift, it is said, did not Uke
humankind in general, but he was satisfied enough with individuals.
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with Tom, & Dick, & Harry. Rawson, on the other hand, would like
us to believe that he loves humanity—that is why he wrote his book.
It's just that he can't find any individual human being he likes, much
less any writer.

